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The recent pace of international agreement aimed to reduce tax evasion and avoidance was completely unpredicted prior to
the ﬁnancial crisis. The two targets are often considered to be merely different dimensions of the same problem. This paper
argues that the two problems actually involve very different logics, and this holds the key to the prospects for success. The
assault on tax evasion confronts a problem that is commonly recognized and admits to amelioration through the increased
information sharing that is rapidly, although unevenly, advancing. Attempts to reduce corporate tax avoidance, however, con-
front ambiguity at every turn. National corporate tax systems differ markedly from each other in rules as well as rates, and
agreement necessarily takes place in an ever more competitive international business environment in which national rate and
rule setting will remain largely independent. Moreover, increased attention to the international taxation of business seems to
have increased rather than dampened unilateral initiatives to advance national gain.
Policy Implications
• The US should require the collection of information on beneﬁcial ownership of companies.
• The US should move swiftly to reduce the corporate income rate substantially while reexamining practices that others
states deem abusive.
• Unilateral international business tax reforms by all states should weigh the impacts on others and involve consultation
with them.
• The OECD should continue to dampen tax conﬂicts by applying its expertise on compromise and peer review beyond the
G20.
International cooperation on tax issues falls into two broad his-
torical periods with essentially opposite concerns. From the
time of the First World War and for decades after the Sec-
ond, cooperation aimed at reducing the double taxation of
income that could result from overlapping revenue claims.
Starting in earnest in the 1990s, the focus shifted to tax eva-
sion and avoidance: ‘double non-taxation’. That second
phase continues, and activity has burgeoned in the years
since the ﬁnancial crisis. Both evasion and avoidance are
under attack with a visibility and apparent political determi-
nation that was almost completely unpredicted prior to the
crisis. Most analyses of the recent period treat evasion and
avoidance together. This is a mistake because they involve
very differ logics. The attack on evasion could ultimately
result in a stable equilibrium outcome of greatly reduced
tax cheating while the current assault on corporate tax
avoidance may have accelerated unilateral initiatives and
increased tax competition.
Most attention to international tax issues in political
science and law devotes principal attention to revenue col-
lection and its distribution across jurisdictions. In sharp con-
trast, an economic approach often focuses on wealth
maximization by a unitary rational actor in which revenue
gains or losses are only a component. While the single actor
assumption clearly oversimpliﬁes, this paper argues that the
economic approach can illuminate the larger picture and is
necessary to explore the prospects for policy development.
Speciﬁcally, any forecast of cooperation on taxation requires
an investigation of a state’s national interest construed sim-
ply as wealth enhancement, even if that interest is substan-
tially distorted by special interests, as it invariably is. This
paper will employ that approach, paying particular attention
to the largest single actor in global tax matters, the United
States. Not only does the US still account for nearly a quar-
ter of the world’s product, over ten per cent of total trade,
and more than a ﬁfth of incoming and outgoing direct
investment stocks, but its federal system and recently vola-
tile politics make it the most problematic factor in global
tax policy.
The paper will ﬁrst outline the central argument. This is
followed by a brief history of policy development over the
twentieth century. The differing paths of recent international
initiatives on evasion and avoidance are then explored.
The main argument here can be summarized simply:
international cooperation on personal taxes will likely con-
tinue to increase, but corporate tax cooperation will remain
quite limited. This prediction rests on several major differ-
ences. First, the incidence of the personal income tax in a






closed economy is subject to some disagreement, but is
widely accepted to fall mostly on the agent upon whom it
is levied (Mirrlees et al, 2011).1 Second, the concept of tax
evasion, although it involves penalties of varying severity
across polities,2 can be deﬁned quite clearly: a failure to pay
a well-deﬁned tax liability through the use of silence,
secrecy, or deception. Third, personal taxes can be levied at
widely varying rates with only minor direct impact on inter-
national personal mobility. Although the international mobil-
ity of persons in response to tax differences will grow
considerably in the future (Kudrle, 2015), it remains a minor
consideration for most countries now.3 All of this implies a
coordination game for all but a handful of states. That latter
group gains more from proﬁts on activity involving attracted
foreign funds than is lost from the impact of permissiveness
on residents. But most of those states now are small, weak,
and subject to coercion. Cooperation to curtail evasion
through secret foreign investment is highly feasible.
The situation with the corporate income tax differs on
each count. First, the incidence (who really pays?) of the cor-
porate income tax even in a closed economy is strongly dis-
puted as is the rationale for penalizing a particular form of
business organization. The tax also distorts the economy’s
productive system (Mirrlees et al, 2011). Therefore, on both
efﬁciency and equity grounds, most economists favor maxi-
mum feasible integration of business and personal taxation.
Second, although corporation tax evasion cannot be
ignored, the major policy concern is the scope for legal tax
avoidance by large traded ﬁrms, which is inherently some-
what vague. Firms may act on several motives at once.
Sometimes transactions having no economic purpose except
to avoid taxation can be attacked, but avoidance is intrinsi-
cally much less clear than evasion. Third, differing effective
relative tax rates among states have been shown to alter
the ﬂow of real corporate capital and overall corporate activ-
ity substantially (OECD, 2015b) as well greatly distorting the
distribution of proﬁt claims across jurisdictions. Furthermore,
nearly two hundred countries in varying economic circum-
stances will be able to agree on only a limited set of prac-
tices, and competition among states cannot be effectively
controlled if anything like the present corporate tax system
remains in place.
The early conventions
Absent other considerations, states will want to collect rev-
enue from all entities within their sphere of enforcement. So
if a natural person resident in country A earns income
sourced in country B, A will want to tax its resident and B
will want to tax the person’s income at its source. And, with-
out understood rules, this tension can lead to taxation levels
that strangle commerce recognized as beneﬁcial to both
states.
A similar tension applies to capital: net national ‘lenders’
acting as unitary rational actors would favor the residence
principle and net ‘borrowers’ the source principle.4 The
acceptance of the source principle for multinational corpora-
tions (MNCs) rested on two main arguments. First, nothing
could prevent source countries from taxing local activity to
any extent they chose, so arguments in favor of a pure resi-
dence principle aimed at countries that were overwhelm-
ingly hosts could not prevail. Second, the beneﬁt principle
of taxation suggests that the social framework – the legal,
administrative, and physical infrastructure – for successful
operation by foreign ﬁrms justiﬁes source taxation. In con-
trast, portfolio (non-controlling) investment by foreigners,
either through debt or equity, maps much less clearly to for-
eign government resource cost. Such thinking was inﬂuen-
tial in forging what became known as the ‘1920s
compromise’: direct investment was to be primarily taxed by
the source (“host”) state while passive income ﬂows from
non-controlling investment were to be less heavily taxed at
source, with the principal tax levied by the residence
(‘home’) country.5
These were only generally accepted notions; actual bilat-
eral treaties and non-treaty arrangements were subject to
considerable variety. Nevertheless, the presumption of
source taxation of multinational proﬁts served international
business interests by making their activity more attractive to
host countries. This goes a long way towards explaining
why the United Nations model treaty, ﬁrst presented in
1981 (United Nations Department of Economic and Social
Affairs, 1981) bears a strong resemblance to that developed
by the high income countries in the League of Nations and
subsequently by the OECD. The models divide mainly in
their language concerning the taxation of intra-ﬁrm pay-
ments (such as dividends and royalties) and the level of
local activity necessary to trigger any corporate taxation at
all. On these issues, the UN model is unsurprisingly more
favorable to host countries.
Residence countries have adopted two major approaches
to corporate taxation. Most states allow residual proﬁts of
foreign business to go untaxed at the corporate level at
home, while crediting states offset foreign corporate tax
payments against what would be home country tax liability.
The distinction between the two approaches blurs in actual
policy, however. Exemption systems typically include excep-
tions for foreign corporate earnings deemed to be too
lightly taxed, while the principal crediting country, the Uni-
ted States, has allowed any remaining taxes on foreign earn-
ings to be deferred until dividends are repatriated so long
as those funds are deployed in active foreign business.
Despite variety, the acceptance of the several-times revised
OECD treaty of 1963 (cf. OECD, 1963, 2014) as a baseline for
individual bilateral bargains, sometimes alloyed with ele-
ments of the UN instrument, avoided the expense and fric-
tion of largely redundant activity and has signaled a
willingness to engage with commercial partners on terms
similar to generally prevailing practice.
The problem of secrecy
Most countries – again the US is the main exception – have
exempted a resident natural person’s labor service income
from abroad, but nearly all have attempted to tax earnings
on foreign assets owned by residents (using varying
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deﬁnitions of ‘resident’). In both crediting and exemption
systems, personal tax evasion through the secret holding of
foreign investments, often employing various business enti-
ties as vehicles, has plagued tax collection for more than a
century (Avi-Yonah, 2010)
Information sharing is treated in most bilateral income tax
treaties, but until recently such sharing was usually quite
limited. More importantly, many of the so-called tax havens
had no tax treaties, and they rejected all elements of trans-
parency until well into this century. Their position – justiﬁed
by the traditional ‘revenue rule’ that a state has no obliga-
tion to help another state collect taxes – had profound
implications for both personal evasion and corporate avoid-
ance. States have historically varied widely in their recogni-
tion of the concept of ﬁnancial privacy, and foreign
investors in high privacy states (such as Switzerland) were
often merely afforded the same rights as prevailed locally. In
addition, states that did not levy either personal or corpo-
rate income taxes (such as the Caribbean tax havens)
claimed no reason to collect and maintain data relevant
only to tax payment elsewhere.
The investment of funds in jurisdictions with little or no
taxation and high levels of institutional secrecy was decried
in the US Treasury’s Gordon Report of 1981 (Gordon, 1981),
which declared the need for international cooperation. Many
of the same concerns were echoed in the OECD’s Harmful
Tax Competition (HTC) report of 1998 (OECD, 1998),
although, as in the Gordon Report, concerns about tax eva-
sion and avoidance were not sharply distinguished. In fact,
the OECD HTC study, from which the most recent set of
anti-evasion activities can be traced, anticipated an initial
cooperative emphasis on the curtailment of corporate tax
avoidance. HTC accepted the decision of states to impose lit-
tle or no personal or corporate taxation but attacked the
havens for a lack of effective exchange of information, a
lack of transparency about the operation of their tax sys-
tems, and ‘insubstantial’ activity by foreign businesses claim-
ing jurisdiction. Practices with similar effects within the
OECD were also condemned.
The HTC project initially threatened several dozen tax
havens with unspeciﬁed punitive action by OECD members.
A Forum was established to draw up a list of offending juris-
dictions and to implement agreed action plans with the
understanding that intra-OECD measures would also be pur-
sued.6 Following strong pressure from international business,
the requirement for ‘substantial’ activity was effectively evis-
cerated by 2001 through artful changes in stated demands.
It was then dropped completely at the insistence of the
Bush administration, which nonetheless claimed support for
measures against tax evasion. The OECD project had by
then adopted a much more conciliatory approach and
demanded only that the havens make a public declaration
to move towards the collection and exchange of tax-rele-
vant information upon request. Non-recalcitrant havens
became Forum ‘partners’ in OECD efforts that created a
model tax information exchange agreement (TIEA). That
instrument sought to gain information that might have
been obtained through tax treaties had they existed.
Existing tax treaties were also revised to make the appropri-
ateness of such information sharing explicit.
In response to the demand for greater ﬁnancial informa-
tion sharing in the wake of the attacks of September 11,
2001, many tax havens declared their cooperation with the
OECD and similar demands from the Financial Action Task
Force, which was established by the G7 in 1989 to combat
money laundering but had shifted its focus to terrorist
ﬁnance. By 2007 only the tiny European semi-states of
Andorra, Liechtenstein, and Monaco continued to hold out
against the model TIEA.
The ﬁnancial collapse of 2008 and highly publicized tax
evasion schemes on both sides of the Atlantic propelled the
OECD information demands to the agenda of the London
G20 meeting in April, 2009, which, in turn, brought the last
holdouts on board and called some other states onto the
carpet.
As was the case after the Asian Financial Crisis, the G7
combined resources with mostly major developing countries
in the G20 to face the global meltdown. But the G20 subse-
quently expanded its attention to taxes, and this changed
the face of opposition to the tax havens: The non-OECD
states sought control of overseas tax evasion as well as
other unwanted capital outﬂows and more effective MNC
taxation. They therefore provided a powerful legitimizing
force for ignoring the complaints of the small and weak
(but not typically low income) tax havens, which had contin-
ued to mount a public relations attack against the OECD’s
HTC as an imperialist affront.
Complete formal capitulation by the traditional tax havens
would not have been predicted only a few years earlier.
Nevertheless, the victory was hollow. Those seeking informa-
tion needed to know what they were looking for, and the
responding state had little incentive to comply beyond what
would be necessary to avoid retaliation from the under-
served party. The latter point underlined how disadvanta-
geous the agreed system was for states other than the
richest and most powerful. This could not be an equilibrium
for the G20.
Secrecy and the national interest
The pattern of adherence to secrecy and resistance to
change reveals three sets of states. The ﬁrst group consists
of most states that for reasons of history and general policy
orientation would always lose far more by permitting ﬁnan-
cial secrecy than they could ever gain. This includes most
developed countries and virtually all low income states.
The second group are net beneﬁciaries of secrecy or
those whose governments have been persuaded that this is
true. For a small state actor, the beneﬁt of secrecy policy is
the total increase in real activity drawn to the low tax (or
loose regulation) jurisdiction and the associated tax revenue.
The gain from this investment will be a very small fraction
of the total funds involved because they come in one door
and out the other with minimal local value added. But
because the amount of ﬁnancial activity that can be booked
bears little relation to the size of the enticing jurisdiction,
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the potential beneﬁts linked to a small gain per unit of that
volume may be substantial. This can explain not only the
policies of the island tax havens but also the historic reluc-
tance of Switzerland, Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, Liecht-
enstein, Andorra and Monaco to embrace both EU and HTC
efforts.
Two large countries have also been conspicuously tolerant
of ﬁnancial secrecy: the UK and the US Both states have his-
torically harbored huge amounts of personal foreign ﬁnan-
cial investment, much of it from low income countries in
violation of those countries’ domestic laws. London has long
been the largest ﬁnancial center in Europe, drawing funds
from all over the world, some aimed at evasion. Moreover,
the origin of much tax haven activity in the Caribbean,
which has funneled a large share of those funds into Lon-
don, fulﬁlled the vision of colonial administrators who saw
ﬁnance as a complement to sugar and tourism in those
dependent territories (Hampton and Christensen, 2002).
The US had a long history of not taxing bank interest or
tracking the ownership of bank accounts (except for Canadi-
ans). In addition, the Reagan administration extended this
practice to other foreign portfolio interest with the ostensi-
ble purpose of bolstering the US balance of payments. This
highly proﬁtable situation for the ﬁnancial industry gener-
ated successful opposition to Bush Treasury attempts to
share information as recommended by the OECD and to
cooperate in the enforcement of the EU Savings Directive of
2003 (European Union, 2003).
Both the smaller reluctant states of Europe and the tradi-
tional tax havens elsewhere were clearly vulnerable to pres-
sure from the EU and the US But little happened until the
US and the UK committed to diminished secrecy. The tax
bureaucracies of both had long favored such a commitment,
but their political masters had remained ambivalent. It took
the general stench surrounding the ﬁnancial industry after
2008, intensiﬁed by some highly speciﬁc and hugely publi-
cized instances of perﬁdy – such as those revealed by the
stolen records of secret German investors in Liechtenstein
and whistle-blowing about large numbers of US evaders
encouraged by the Union Bank of Switzerland – to discredit
opposition to reform (US Senate, 2008). Transparency initia-
tives from the Obama administration met strident opposi-
tion mainly from some libertarian elements in the
Republican Party and banking industry lobbyists. The incum-
bent Conservative government in the UK, long under anti-
secrecy pressure from its major EU partners, obviously found
no resistance from Labor. And, despite the economic chal-
lenges of Brexit, Theresa May has declared that anti-evasion
efforts will continue and even increase (Elliott et al., 2016).
The global shift to a comprehensive and determined
attack on evasion moved along two tracks. As part of
macroeconomic stimulus legislation in the wake of the
ﬁnancial crisis, the Obama administration introduced the
Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) of 2010 (US
Congress, 2010), that levied a withholding tax of 30 per cent
on all ﬁnancial institutions placing investments into US mar-
kets from abroad unless those institutions reported detailed
information on all accounts with American ownership.
FATCA started as hegemonic nationalist assertion rather
than cooperation: the aim was to ﬁght tax evasion by Amer-
icans. The US presented foreign institutions, not govern-
ments, with a choice: collect the demanded information or
face a ruinous penalty. Major economic partners of the US
strongly objected to FATCA at the outset, both as unilateral-
ism and as a threat to national laws protecting ﬁnancial pri-
vacy. But their institutions could not thrive without
investment through the US ﬁnancial system (Hoke, 2016).
More positively, many states quickly saw that their own best
interests were served by shifting the focus of cooperation
from individual institutions to their national governments,
which could then press for reciprocal action from the United
States. Such a nationalization of compliance became the
basis for the intergovernmental agreements (IGAs) that were
jointly announced by the US, the UK, France, Germany,
Spain, and Italy in 2012 (US Treasury, 2016) and gave great
impetus to a drive for automatic information sharing that
involved dozens of countries within a few years.7
US international economic bargaining is always dogged
by two complications that most countries lack: a major,
independent legislative role in foreign policy and the pre-
rogatives of the several states. Both characteristics have
clouded the future of FATCA. The standard language of a
FATCA IGA states: ‘The United States is committed to further
improve transparency and enhance the exchange relation-
ship with [FATCA Partner] by pursuing the adoption of regu-
lations and advocating and supporting relevant legislation
to achieve such equivalent levels of reciprocal automatic
exchange’ (US Department of the Treasury, 2014, p. 16). In
other words, the US executive declares support for a high
degree of reciprocity but cannot assure it. Indeed, one dis-
senting Republican legislator pointed out in a letter to the
Treasury that parallel obligation was not part of the
enabling FATCA legislation (Posey, 2013).
Congressional concurrence constrains the US executive,
but so do the several states. State law governs the formation
and most regulation of American business, and ‘shell’ compa-
nies with no purpose but obfuscation can completely conceal
beneﬁcial ownership and hence block transparency. Some
American states require so little information on companies
that they often serve as the weakest informational link in glo-
bal webs of evasion. In principle, federal supremacy can over-
come the problem, but, despite vastly differing political
complexions, the states typically unite to battle federal
encroachment and underfunded mandates, and they have
done so strenuously on company information. Bipartisan fed-
eral legislation to require the collection and veriﬁcation of
beneﬁcial ﬁrm ownership has been introduced several times
without success. Nevertheless, executive commitment was
signaled by 2012 Treasury regulation changes, ﬁrst proposed
in the Bush administration, to oblige ﬁnancial institutions to
collect information on interest paid to foreigners so it can be
shared internationally (US Internal Revenue Service, 2012).
Additionally, the Panama papers furor helped propel new
Treasury regulations in 2016 that require information to be
collected on beneﬁcial ownership of new accounts in a range
of ﬁnancial institutions beginning in 2018.
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FATCA was only one prong of the attack. The TIEA-draft-
ing Forum launched in 2002 was revamped and given more
structure in 2009 by the OECD-initiated and G20-embraced
Global Forum on Transparency and the Exchange of Infor-
mation for Tax Purposes. The Global Forum immediately
endorsed more effective information exchange and estab-
lished a peer review system long employed by the OECD
(Martens and Jakobi, 2010).
Emboldened by the apparent determination of the US
and the EU to move strongly against tax evasion, the Global
Forum adopted a model Convention in 2010 that contained
all the core requirements of the previous model TIEA. It also
covered a broader range of taxes, allowed joint tax investi-
gations and – most important – provided the option of
automatic information exchange similar to the FATCA provi-
sions (OECD, 2012).
Just as was the case with the information by request
agreements there was no explicit enforcement mechanism
within the new agreed commitments. Nevertheless, the
FATCA mechanism is the most obvious tool for an enforcing
state: cooperate or face a stiff withholding. Incentive com-
patibility is notably high with the new approach, just as it
was very low for the approach based on information provi-
sion upon request. Very signiﬁcantly, ﬁnancial institutions
have a powerful interest in assuring their own government’s
cooperation to avoid foreign retaliation.
The OECD serves as the de facto secretariat for the G20
by developing the technical elements of automatic informa-
tion exchange as well as the boilerplate for incorporation of
the new approach into national law. The OECD is also
orchestrating the entire project to achieve legal and admin-
istrative congruence of FATCA with both EU transparency
measures and the OECD-G20 Common Reporting Standard
(OECD, 2016b). The new approach holds the potential to
deter tax evasion substantially. The literature on domestic
taxation demonstrates that automatic earnings reporting to
governments results in much higher levels of tax compli-
ance than is achieved otherwise (US GAO, 1997).
Signiﬁcant revenue stakes attach to automatic information
exchange. One study estimates the annual tax loss from
secrecy at $189 billion globally (Henry, 2012). Using a very
different methodology, Gabriel Zucman (2013) has estimated
that eight percent of all personal wealth in held in tax
havens, and three-quarters of that is not recorded. And the
signiﬁcance of evasion goes well beyond immediately lost
revenue. Perceived evasion lowers overall tax compliance
(Luttmer and Singhal, 2014).
By late 2016 more than a hundred countries had commit-
ted to the introduction of automatic information exchange
within a few years. The US, however, cannot comply without
overcoming the federal-state standoff. Moreover, the Repub-
lican platform of 2016 called for the abolition of FATCA as
invasive and costly, and even if some version of FATCA is
retained, the Trump administration would seem unlikely to
push for increased US cooperation unless a politically potent
case is made that it would substantially lower evasion by US
taxpayers. Some have suggested foreign retaliation against a
laggard US, but that might delay cooperation rather than
hastening it. Bringing US policy close to what America suc-
cessfully demanded from others might await a future
administration.
Recent initiatives on corporate income taxation
The policy developments outlined so far were aimed mainly
at personal tax evasion rather than corporate tax avoidance,
but the G8’s June 2013 Lough Erne declaration took on
both: ‘(1) Tax authorities across the world should automati-
cally share information to ﬁght the scourge of tax evasion
and (2) Countries should change rules that let companies
shift their proﬁts across borders to avoid taxes, and multina-
tionals should report to tax authorities what tax they pay
where’. (GOV.UK, 2013)
The ﬁght against evasion had a well-deﬁned and widely
shared purpose. Although the road to automatic information
sharing still faces obstacles, particularly in the US, the basic
goal of such shared information has been recognized as
desirable by the OECD for at least 20 years. As political
opposition – beneﬁting polities and special interests within
others – has been overcome, a stable equilibrium has come
within reach.8 The situation with large ﬁrm avoidance of the
corporate income tax is completely different, despite the
fact that the two taxes have generated a common concern
about abuse, and both are associated in the public mind
with tax havens.
Riding general popular concern about international tax
dodging, the OECD launched the Base Erosion and Proﬁt
Shifting (BEPS) project in 2013 declaring the main goal ‘to
align the right to tax with the real economic activity
that generates the income’ (OECD, 2013b, p. 19). At that
level of generality, there was little ofﬁcial international
disagreement.
A major facilitating practice for both base erosion and
proﬁt shifting was intra-ﬁrm transfer pricing of goods and
services that were supposed to be done as if at ‘arm’s
length’ – as if the afﬁliates were completely independent
ﬁrms – but in fact nearly always allowed great ﬁrm discre-
tion in moving proﬁts to low tax areas. The project ﬁrst pro-
duced both an Overview (OECD, 2013a) and an Action Plan
in 2013 (OECD, 2013b) and a series of ﬁnal reports in Octo-
ber of 2015 (OECD, 2015a). The topics of the reports capture
many of the main dimensions of further cooperation, and
reﬂect rough consensus within the G20. The topics consid-
ered fell mainly into several broad clusters: inconsistent
deﬁnitions of overseas entities and associated rules about
intra-ﬁrm transactions; harmful government practices that
allow inappropriate jurisdictional claims for various activities;
the abuse of treaty provisions by allowing advantages for
unintended claimants; a lack of clarity about the necessary
characteristics of the ‘permanent establishment’ that justiﬁes
source corporate taxation in the ﬁrst place; the need for
more oversight of the migration of intellectual property to
low tax areas not justiﬁed by value-added or risk contribu-
tions; requirements that ﬁrms clarify ‘aggressive tax plan-
ning’ practices to tax authorities; country by country
reporting of key ﬁnancial information; increased
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commitment to the timely resolution of tax disputes; and
the content of a multilateral instrument that would super-
sede the OECD model treaty. The thirteen BEPS ﬁnal reports
run to over 1,900 pages, much of it suggestive, discursive,
and aspirational, in sharp contrast to the far more speciﬁc
language of most anti-evasion documents.
Early in 2016, ongoing BEPS deliberations under the aus-
pices of the OECD’s Committee on Fiscal Affairs concluded
that the acceptance of four principles would exempt a coun-
try from special scrutiny as a likely violator of the thrust of
the BEPS project. These were: tackling harmful tax practices,
acting against treaty abuse, committing to country-by-coun-
try (CbC) reporting, and improving dispute resolution. Partic-
ipation in continuing BEPS activity was opened beyond the
G20 to all interested countries (OECD, 2016a).
Although the BEPS project produced a massive product
that achieved consensus, just below the surface lurked unre-
solvable tensions that might be managed but not perma-
nently resolved. This can be seen in three broad positions
that were clearly discernable before the BEPS project began.
First, the United States sought to minimize near-term
change in the regime. The BEPS reports focus heavily on the
US: the practices of its ﬁrms and its policies. In fact, the
same Obama government that led the charge on tax eva-
sion engaged only cautiously with the BEPS project. The
domestic politics were utterly different. Except for parts of
the ﬁnancial industry, US business was either indifferent
towards, or in support of, a clampdown on international tax
evasion (US Council for International Business, 2004). In
sharp contrast, US tax administrators and international busi-
ness alike accepted the position that the very high US head-
line corporate tax rate –about 39 per cent (federal plus
state) – had to be countered by rules that allowed for a
much lower effective tax rate for much of US business
competing abroad against more lightly taxed foreign
competitors.
US politicians felt heat from inﬂuential constituent groups
upset about the massive tax-deferred proﬁts piling up in tax
havens, sometimes employing legal devices that could scar-
cely be described with a straight face (US Congress, 2013).
But leaders in both parties along with business and the tax
bureaucracy saw clearly that even the most egregious of
these schemes typically kept proﬁts in the hands of Ameri-
cans rather than foreign governments, and that change
should be modest, at least until the US adopted more com-
petitive corporate taxation. Completely untaxed proﬁt, ‘state-
less income,’ was widely decried, but most inﬂuential actors
still sought to allow ﬁrms great ﬂexibility to maximize for-
eign net earnings and compete successfully against rival
ﬁrms governed by territorial (exemption) tax systems.
The US also wanted to maintain the interpretation of ‘per-
manent establishment’ as it has been normally recognized
in America’s bilateral tax treaties and interpreted under US
law. This involves little attention to how nominal may be
the independence of a local agent acting on behalf of a for-
eign ﬁrm. But other governments care a great deal. While
famous US ﬁrms arranged foreign activity in ways designed
to minimize permanent establishments in high corporate tax
jurisdictions, host states, rich and poor, in which those ﬁrms
make their sales have attempted to redeﬁne local activity
minima to increase local taxation. American MNCs take
advantage of US tax code discretion that may result in little
or no taxation if gains can be transferred out of the country
of sales. In contrast, many prominent home countries
with territorial systems employ rules that control such non-
taxation.
The US accepted the BEPS principle of international shar-
ing of certain ﬁnancial information about MNC operations
largely as means of enforcing its own laws. But a major US
concern – shared to a varying extent by all major home
countries – has been to avoid facilitating mainly, but not
exclusively, low income hosts from developing rules for
proﬁt assignment that stray from the standard of ‘arm’s
length’ valuation of international transactions.
Overall, the Obama administration walked a ﬁne line
between the immediate national economic interest and glo-
bal leadership in the BEPS deliberations. The national inter-
est demanded short-run caution. Most particularly, increased
effective tax rates on US MNCs could only have accelerated
the already severe problem of a shift in headquarters to
other countries. But the US could also suffer from obduracy
about egregious practices. The claim that certain practices
compensated for the absence of more sensible tax rates
seemed an admission of poor governance, and it also high-
lighted equity issues within the business community where
some purely national US ﬁrms compete against tax-advan-
taged US MNCs. This relates to the broader issue of tax mor-
ale. If Americans believe that their corporations are not
being taxed fairly, that likely affects general tax compliance
behavior, however difﬁcult to quantify (Luttmer and Singhal,
2014).
A second identiﬁable position was taken by most rich
states other than the US As a group they were angered by
the combination of minimal claimed local activity by many
major US MNCs and high estimated proﬁts from serving
their national markets. The UK Diverted Proﬁts Tax intro-
duced in 2015 levied a surtax on ﬁrms deemed to have
avoided an appropriate level of local taxation. Australia and
a number of continental EU states have moved to introduce
similar taxes. More generally, the increased political atten-
tion to corporate taxation seems to have generated a major
wave of unilateral initiatives in both rich and poor countries
that go well beyond previous understandings of corporate
tax obligation.
Finally, there are the middle and lower income states –
traditional tax havens excepted. Their objectives include
both a lower threshold of activity for permanent establish-
ment and a more administrable – and immediately remu-
nerative – system for taxing MNCs thereafter. The ‘arm’s
length’ intra-ﬁrm transfer price standard challenges rich
countries, but it often defeats poor ones.
BEPS ﬁnal reports endorsed the maintenance of the arm’s
length standard and proposed no major changes in perma-
nent establishment. BEPS’s most visible innovation, the coor-
dinated gathering of uniform information on large ﬁrm
operations country by country (CbC) involves sharing only
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among governments and not with the general public as
some advocacy groups had wanted. Some leading Republi-
can legislators have asked for statutory justiﬁcation for CbC
reporting (Hatch and Ryan, 2015), and if the Trump adminis-
tration views it as a potential source of competitive disad-
vantage for US ﬁrms, CbC reporting could become another
source of dispute between the US and the rest of the world.
Rhetoric about lost revenue has driven much of the politi-
cal determination to tighten the international corporate tax
regime, just as it has for the drive against tax evasion. Yet
the initial BEPS document notes that in many cases it ‘may
be difﬁcult to know which country has lost revenue’. This
speaks volumes about the complexity of corporate arrange-
ments and the great uncertainty that surrounds the inci-
dence of the tax.
BEPS Final Report No. 11 offers some estimates of aggre-
gate tax losses. One OECD study from a large database
found global losses in 2014 to be 100 to 240 billion dollars,
and there is virtual unanimity that poorer countries lose far
more relative to national revenue or income than do the
rich (OECD, 2015b). But such estimates rest on counterfactu-
als that cannot distinguish between MNC cunning and gov-
ernment enticement, and they rely heavily on shortfalls
from what would be collected at declared tax rates. Report
No. 11 concedes that a more determined effort to collect
taxes at headline rates could hasten a lowering of those
rates by increasing already intense international tax compe-
tition. With respect to the latter, the UK anticipates dropping
its headline rate from 20 to 17 percent by 2018. In addition,
the British government has declared its determination to
establish the lowest rates in the G20, presumably driven by
the challenges of Brexit. The 2017 Obama budget proposed
a reduction in the headline federal rate, from 35 to 28 per
cent (Pozen, 2015), and Donald Trump campaigned on a 15
per cent rate; both of these plans also include the elimina-
tion of deferral. These are massive changes, yet they are
completely consistent with international rules. Even if not
countered strategically, they would generate revenue out-
comes that could be only roughly estimated. And US
changes almost certainly would be countered: the US has
been shown to be a Stackelberg leader9 in corporate tax
rate setting (Kumar and Quinn, 2012).
The Obama administration expressed willingness to con-
sider signing a new multilateral instrument to modify bilat-
eral treaties so long as it includes a satisfactory recognition
of the need for binding dispute arbitration, something also
favored by other rich countries but traditionally resisted by
lower income states. The forecast was apparently that there
would be rather little substantive change in the new con-
vention, and some questionable language could be traded
off for greater constraint on departure from historical inter-
pretations (Parillo, 2014). The Trump government might well
differ. More broadly, within whatever general bounds are
agreed, each home state retains the option of denying
credit or exemption for what it deems inappropriate initia-
tives by its partners. This is clear where no treaty exists –
and because of its insistence on certain features, the US is
party to only 68 of the more than 3,000 treaties – but it is
also an option where the host country has interpreted
agreements in an unacceptable way. International business
taxation will continue to rest on compromise, and double
taxation follows a breakdown of understanding.
The extent of feasible agreement on revised boilerplate
rules for corporate taxation remains unclear. But that misses
the most important point. However much compromise may
be achieved on paper, the structure of the game – nearly
200 players pursuing national advantage with only minimal
agreement about tax rules and essentially none about rates
– cannot lead to a stable policy outcome of the kind envi-
sioned for tax evasion. Moreover, international market forces
can only intensify. This suggests ever lower corporate tax
rates in the absence of radical reform.
One major departure from the current system has long
been favored by many developing countries because of its
apparent solution to the transfer pricing problem. The
national tax base would be determined by some combina-
tion of an MNC’s national sales, plant and equipment, and
employment as a fraction of the ﬁrm’s global totals, and
then each state would then levy its own tax rate. Even if this
alternative were really superior to the arm’s standard on
technical grounds – and careful analysis suggests skepticism
(e.g., Altshuler and Grubert, 2010) – gaining agreement from
scores of countries on the formula and its implementation
appears completely infeasible. The states of the EU have
unsuccessfully attempted to develop such a scheme for
more than ten years.
Another radical solution to proﬁt shifting lies in the 20
per cent Destination Based Cash Flow Tax, endorsed by US
House Republicans in 2016, that would leave exports
untaxed while taxing imports, with the overall effect only on
economic rent (‘excess’ proﬁts rather than all corporate
income) and with collection by the country of ﬁnal sales (US
House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means,
Ways and Means Committee, 2016), thus eliminating the
advantages of manipulating claims about the jurisdictional
sources of proﬁt. This policy direction shares with formula
apportionment the potential to throw the existing interna-
tional corporate taxation system into chaos if adopted
unilaterally, and it has such disruptive international distribu-
tional implications that it could not be adopted coopera-
tively. Moreover, it violates WTO rules that allow the
remission of indirect taxes on exports such as VAT while
treating remission of direct taxes on exports as a forbidden
subsidy, a distinction that much US discussion treats as a
technicality rather than a barrier to action (e.g. Auerbach
and Holtz-Eakin, 2016). Given the Trump administration’s
apparent disregard for consultation or previous agreements,
only domestic political forces, particularly importers who
doubt economists’ claims that increases in the value of the
dollar would erase their seeming disadvantage, stand in the
way of adoption.
Conclusion
The personal and corporate taxation elements of the inter-
national tax regime rest on very different policy logics. This
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fact may be obscured by the greatly increased attention to
both in the wake of the ﬁnancial crisis. The relative clarity
and simplicity of an all-out attack on personal tax evasion
promises eventual success. In sharp contrast, the extreme
complexity of the corporate tax system and especially its
inevitable competitive dimension means that success deﬁes
deﬁnition, let alone realization. Competition means that
rates will almost certainly continue to fall. This will ulti-
mately lead to a global decline in corporate tax revenue rel-
ative to national income as has already happened in many
lower income countries, which as a group depend more
heavily on corporate taxation than do the rich. In addition,
disruptive unilateral reforms of international business taxa-
tion appear more likely than ever before.
The central role of the US in both the evasion and avoid-
ance projects and the extent to which outcomes through
the Obama administration reﬂected US preferences suggest
a high level of remaining US hegemony in international tax
matters but also great responsibility. The Trump administra-
tion may ignore the latter.
Notes
1. For the sake of simplicity the focus will be on personal income
taxation but the taxation of personal wealth has many of the same
characteristics.
2. In some countries, notably Switzerland, tax evasion as distinct from
tax fraud, has not been treated as a felony.
3. Maximum effect could be expected within the EU. Some estimates
for the departure of entrepreneurs from France in recent years in
response to taxation have been large, but evidence is almost entirely
anecdotal.
4. The terms are in parentheses because direct investment is ownership
not lending, and hosting is not borrowing; foreign direct investment
(FDI) became an increasingly large part of total capital ﬂows over time.
5. Differing, but largely complementary, accounts of these develop-
ments are provided by Graetz and O’Hear, 1997 and Avi-Yonah,
2005.
6. Unless otherwise indicated, factual material in the rest of this section
is drawn from Kudrle, 2008 and 2014.
7. A Cox proportional hazard survival analysis (justiﬁed by a TVC test )
of speed of commitment to FATCA over several years shows a
strongly signiﬁcant positive impact of per capita GDP but not of total
GDP or portfolio investment. The simplest explanation is that compli-
ance is quite expensive and more daunting for poorer countries.
Results available from the author.
8. There will likely always be international disagreement about the
appropriateness of sharing with speciﬁc governments that might
misuse the information.
9. In this context, such leadership means that the U.S. sets its rates
knowing others will adjust to them on the followers’ assumption that
the U.S. will maintain its rates in the face of their adaptation. In fact,
whatever the pattern of the past, the U.S. could respond with further
changes.
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